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Unthought Nature:  
Reply to Penelope Deutscher and Mary Beth Mader
First, I must thank Mary Beth Mader and Penelope Deutscher 
for their meticulous reading and questioning of my work. Because my 
response to Mader builds on my response to Deutscher, I will reply to 
Deutscher first.
What am I doing, Deutscher asks, in mapping aspects of But-
ler, Schelling, and Irigaray onto one another? Closing her discussion, 
Deutscher wonders whether I might be following Irigaray’s own reading 
method, that of expanding and transforming an author’s project by focus-
ing on what that project itself excludes. Let me explore this suggestion 
with reference to an instance of Irigaray’s practice of this method, in her 
Ethics of Sexual Difference, apropos of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s late ontol-
ogy as sketched in the last chapter of The Visible and the Invisible, “The 
Intertwining/The Chiasm.” Many of Irigaray’s criticisms of Merleau-Ponty 
in the course of her reading are debatable, but my concern here is solely 
to elucidate the nature of her reading method.1
Irigaray reads Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology of flesh as structured 
by an impensé—an unthought—of what she calls the “maternal sojourn.” On 
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the one hand, Irigaray recognizes that Merleau-Ponty attributes maternal 
qualities to flesh: he refers to flesh as “the mother” (Merleau-Ponty 267) and 
as “being by porosity and pregnancy” (149). His text implies that in being 
enfolded in a world of flesh, the subject prolongs its “maternal sojourn,” 
remaining ensconced in a substitute womb (Irigaray 173). But on the other 
hand, Irigaray thinks, Merleau-Ponty’s flesh provides a womb that has been 
restructured to give the subject a level of agency and control vis-à-vis its 
mother that no embryo or fetus has. Merleau-Ponty understands the flesh of 
the world in terms of active/passive, touching/touched reversibility (differ-
ent variations of which obtain within each body-subject, between subjects, 
and between subjects and things). Thus, he still understands the contact or 
contiguity between beings in terms of the traditional active/passive polarity, 
albeit reconceived as reversible. But, Irigaray suggests, in the contiguity 
between pregnant woman and fetus, both are “more passive than any pas-
sivity taken in a passive-active couple” (Ethics 154). Moreover, she thinks, 
by understanding touch in terms of reversibility, Merleau-Ponty conceives 
it as anticipating or prefiguring vision, insofar as the latter has historically 
been defined in terms of active/passive polarity—so that although Merleau-
Ponty roots vision in touch, he ultimately still privileges vision. But again, 
in the womb there obtains a relation of touching that absolutely precedes 
any possibility of vision, Irigaray suggests—a relation in which neither 
participant can see the other.
In what sense, exactly, is the maternal sojourn the unthought 
of Merleau-Ponty’s position? His account of flesh is structured by an effort 
to avoid acknowledging the maternal sojourn as Irigaray identifies it (as 
involving an invisible touching “more passive than the passive”). The 
structuring effects of the avoidance are manifest in that Merleau-Ponty 
conceives flesh with reference to the maternal sojourn (as its prolongation), 
yet in point-for-point antithesis to that sojourn. So the maternal sojourn 
is not a matter that lies unequivocally outside Merleau-Ponty’s thought. 
The maternal sojourn is an unthought that is internal to Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought—a matter to which he is not indifferent, of which on the contrary 
he is aware, yet which he tries to avoid or disavow, with shaping effects 
on what he does say. Irigaray, then, identifies an exclusion that constitutes 
Merleau-Ponty’s thought. She does this by noting how the characteristics 
he ascribes to flesh (reversibility; the mapping of vision onto touch) do not 
seem to fit the mother/fetus relation. She describes that sojourn in terms 
that negate Merleau-Ponty’s terms for flesh, in terms of a touch devoid 
of reversible poles and preceding any visibility. Just as Deutscher says, 
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Irigaray’s method is to expand and transform Merleau-Ponty’s conception 
of flesh in light of what she identifies as its constitutive exclusion.
This lengthy account helps me clarify whether my own read-
ing method is the same as that of Irigaray. Let me consider my reading of 
Judith Butler. In Gender Trouble, Butler often appears to be interested in 
the genealogy of claims about sex rather than in sex itself. But as Deutscher 
may be suggesting, Butler might hesitate to draw this distinction, prefer-
ring to enfold “sex itself” into our claims about sex as their purported 
subject-matter or referent. This would create a difficulty for my view (as 
stated in my Luce Irigaray and the Philosophy of Sexual Difference) that 
Butler addresses sex itself rather than “sex itself.”
An important passage in Butler, from my perspective, occurs 
in her early essay “Variations on Sex and Gender: Beauvoir, Wittig, Fou-
cault,” a passage in which Butler asks (with reference to Monique Wittig), 
“Why don’t we name as sexual features our mouths, hands, and backs? 
Her [Wittig’s] answer: we only name sexual [. . .] those features functional 
in reproductive activity” (135). I take it that Butler endorses this answer 
that she attributes to Wittig, that is, that in Butler’s view we class as sexed 
those body parts that have to do with heterosexual sex and reproduction, 
and this because at the center of our gender norms is the prescription of 
heterosexual sex and reproduction (that is, because these norms com-
prise what Butler in Gender Trouble calls “the heterosexual matrix”). 
So, for Butler, what we count as sex is shaped by gender: certain bodily 
properties count as sex-conferring just when they are viewed in light of 
heteronormative gender.2
Are these claims of Butler’s claims about sex itself? They do 
amount to a claim that sex is how biology appears to us, or is the signifi-
cance that biology takes on for us, in light of gender. But does this entail 
that really, in the (hypothetical) absence of gender, biology is nonsexed? 
This implication would follow if Butler thought that we only count certain 
bodily properties as sexed because of gender or that certain bodily prop-
erties only appear to be sexed and to constitute us as sexed individuals 
given gender. (This is far from an absurd view—there could certainly be 
breasts, penises, etc., without gender, but without gender, those bodily 
parts would not suffice to make individuals sexed.) While Butler might 
be read as agnostic here—as thinking that we just cannot know what 
biology, absent gender, might be like—she can also be read as affirming 
the only in the above statements. Indeed, she regularly makes statements 
that encourage such a reading. Consider, for example, her statement that 
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“gender [. . .] designate[s] the very apparatus of production whereby the 
sexes themselves are established” (Gender 7, emphasis added). The talk of 
establishing suggests that sex is instituted or created for the first time as 
an effect of gender, so that without gender, there would be no sex. Insofar 
as Butler’s texts admit of and, at times, encourage such readings, the idea 
that we are naturally, biologically, nonsexed can readily be drawn from 
Butler’s thought despite her reluctance to theorize about sex itself.
This is not to say that the avoidance of sex itself (like the mater-
nal sojourn for Merleau-Ponty) structures Butler’s thought. The situation 
is rather that, although she has good reasons for not wanting to theorize 
sex itself (namely, her concern to foreground the political and contested 
character of all reference to sex), she comes close to engaging in such 
theorization, in spite of herself, to the extent that she suggests that we 
only count as sex what we count as sex because of gender. My method 
of reading Butler, then, is to extend her into what, in spite of herself, she 
comes close to doing.
My method of reading Irigaray is similar. She has reasons 
for denying that we are naturally anything other than either female or 
male in each case. But to support her belief in natural sexual duality, she 
reads thinkers—Hegel, Hölderlin—who write from within a tradition of 
philosophical thinking about nature, also including Schelling, in which 
nature is seen as entering into but always also passing beyond dualities. 
As such, Irigaray finds herself writing from within an approach to nature 
in which nature always exceeds dualities, but she stops short of embracing 
this approach in full. Nonetheless, to the extent that she comes close to 
doing so by virtue of positioning herself within this tradition, her thought 
admits of being extended into that of which she has stopped short. The 
way I read Butler and Irigaray, then, is to extend their ideas not in terms of 
avoidances that structure their thought, but rather into areas with which 
their thought is contiguous despite itself.
Turning now to Mader’s many questions, I will focus on two: 
(1) whether the rhythmic difference with which (as I tried to show in my 
book) Irigaray equates sexual difference collapses back into conventional 
biological sex difference; and (2) how we can access putative tendencies, 
potentials, or natures other than through what they allegedly condition—so 
that there is a threat of tautology in this talk of tendencies and of the puta-
tive tendencies being redundant. (The problem here recalls that discussed 
by Hegel under the rubric of the “dilemma of explanation”: if we invoke 
underlying dispositions or tendencies in order to explain something, then 
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either those dispositions must have a different content to the explanan-
dum—in which case, though, an explanatory gap remains—or the disposi-
tions have the same content as the explanandum—in which case they are 
redundant [465].)3
On the former question, as Mader rightly says, Irigaray often 
describes sexual difference as a difference in the relations of boys and girls 
to their maternal origin. Irigaray has recently suggested that this is her 
fundamental account of sexual difference, anything else she has said of 
it being secondary.4 However, the relational account cannot be Irigaray’s 
only or most fundamental view of sexual difference because there must 
be a difference in the potential generative capacities of boys and girls 
to make possible their divergent resolutions of the transition away from 
their maternal origin. This worries me because it suggests that Irigaray 
thinks (as Mader has neatly put it in a recent article) that “the girl is in fact 
a little mother born of another mother” (374). Yet one of the most attrac-
tive elements of Irigaray’s thought, to my mind, is her proposal that we 
should disambiguate being a woman from being a mother and contest the 
reduction of the female to a maternal function. Disappointingly, Irigaray 
now seems to effect the very reduction that she promised to contest. To 
a significant extent, it is to circumvent this problem that I have tried to 
excavate from Irigaray’s writings an alternative understanding of the sexes 
in terms of rhythms of growth rather than potential relations to biologi-
cal reproduction (and so, too, why I have sought to distinguish this talk of 
rhythms from discourses of biology). In this understanding, girls and boys 
would relate to their mothers via resemblance or difference in respect of 
rhythm rather than reproductive function.
But, as Mader convincingly argues, to know that there are just 
two—linear versus cyclical—rhythms and that these correlate with our 
current sex categories, Irigaray must already be relying on those very cate-
gories, which differentiate human beings on sexual-reproductive grounds. 
This reliance is reflected in that Irigaray picks out only—or at least primar-
ily—bodily features relating to sex and reproduction as manifestations of 
men’s and women’s rhythms, while neglecting nonreproduction-related 
features that disconfirm her linear/cyclical distinction.
If Irigarayan sexual difference is sex difference redescribed 
philosophically as grounded in rhythms, then, sexual difference is still 
sex difference so redescribed. In that case, contrary to what I argued in 
my book, later Irigaray does think that sexual difference, both as rhythmic 
difference and (derivatively) as difference vis-à-vis maternal origins, is 
entangled with—not cleanly separable from—biological, reproductive sex 
d i f f e r e n c e s 155
difference. But this entanglement of sexual and sex difference need not be 
a problem with Irigaray’s position unless reference to biological sex must 
always be merely ideological.5 And, I submit, it is not merely ideological, 
because—contrary to Butler as I interpreted her earlier—we do not only 
cluster certain reproduction-related biological properties together because 
of gender; we do so partly because they really do cluster.6
What of the consequent problem that, for Irigaray, the little girl 
seems to be a little mother like her mother? I am drawn toward the tenta-
tive thought that Irigaray is pointing out a truth: that there is a centrality of 
the mother to each child (a psychical, not necessarily a social, centrality), 
which is such that—generally, not universally—as any child learns his or 
her sex/gender identity, he or she maps this identity in terms of being the 
same or different in kind to the mother. So a sense of being (for instance) 
female will be bound up from the start with an identification with the 
mother. Thus, perhaps Irigaray’s work can assist in thinking why it might 
psychically be very difficult—albeit not necessarily impossible—for us to 
disambiguate the maternal and the female/feminine.
Mader’s second question concerns the broadly Aristotelian 
metaphysics of tendencies, potentials, and realization that I find in Iriga-
ray. Generally, I think that reference to essences, potentials, and “natures” 
can be politically valuable by providing grounds for criticizing existing 
social institutions that stifle our potentials. Likewise, the claim that these 
institutions are a certain way—for instance, patriarchal—“essentially” 
rather than “accidentally” can support a politics of radical change by 
entailing that those institutions must be fundamentally transformed and 
restructured. Reference to nature and to essences, then, can provide 
normative grounds for social criticism.
The problem, though, is that as soon as we want to identify any 
particular unfulfilled tendencies or dispositions, it becomes difficult not 
to naturalize actual features of human beings. An ontology of flux and 
becoming in which there are no determined regularities or dispositions 
might therefore seem to promise more critical leverage. The problems with 
such an ontology, though, are, first, that without identifying any particular 
unfulfilled tendencies, we cannot recommend any determinate direction 
of political change and, second, that since the flux of materiality will have 
to be restricted in some ways by any determinate political arrangement, 
we need further criteria to tell us which restrictions are more desirable 
than others. Supposing that for these reasons we do want to identify some 
unfulfilled tendencies and potentials: how can we do so since ex hypothesi 
these are unrealized? Foucault’s suspicion would be that when we make 
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any such identification, we have been led to postulate as an unrealized 
potential something that is in actuality prohibited or barred (for instance, 
sexuality) merely because the prohibition inescapably refers to what it 
bars in a way that suggests that that thing really, extradiscursively, exists. 
When Irigaray identifies unfulfilled potentials on the part of women and 
men, something slightly different appears to happen: she seems to natu-
ralize what is already actual, such as the norm reducing the female to the 
maternal, or certain socially legitimated male forms of aggression. But 
then rather than facilitating change, Irigaray’s reference to natures or 
potentials risks prohibiting change by reinstalling the actual as its horizon.
However, Irigaray’s mode of reading may offer a way forward. 
As I have suggested, she identifies the unthought of a text by looking for 
what that text both refers to and also negates, indicating the presence 
of a structuring avoidance. Irigaray then thinks the text’s unthought by 
negating that text’s negation, for example by characterizing the mater-
nal sojourn in terms of a touching prior to visibility, negating Merleau-
Ponty’s idea that touch and vision map onto one another. This reading 
method might give Irigaray a way to identify women’s (and perhaps men’s) 
unfulfilled potentials as the unthought of Western culture (assuming for 
now that we can speak of such an entity)—as that which Western culture 
negates or thwarts but to which it also refers. But there has to be evidence 
that Western culture refers to, or is preoccupied with, these potentials as 
well as thwarting them. The evidence, for Irigaray, is that Western culture 
has its intellectual and mythical basis in certain ancient Greek texts, such 
as the Oresteia of Aeschylus, which narrate the suppression of preexisting 
matrilineal forms of life that operated upon a more cyclical time frame. 
Western culture thus combines a mythical reference to matrilineal and 
cyclical forms of life with a point-for-point negation of their features—
being instead patriarchal and organized around the linear temporality 
of progress and technological development. By negating this negation, 
Irigaray can infer that these matrilineal forms of life had a cyclical time 
frame because there is a connection between being female and cyclical 
rhythms, and hence that female sexual difference consists in a distinc-
tive rhythm of growth unrealized in modern Western societies. At least 
in principle, then, Irigaray’s reading strategy offers her a way to identify 
unfulfilled potentials without simply reproducing what actually exists.
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1 The objection that Irigaray’s 
criticisms of Merleau-Ponty are 
uncharitable, artificially inflating 
the difference between his ontol-
ogy of f lesh and her philosophy 
of sexual difference, is found in 
many of the articles in Olkowski 
and Weiss.
2 It might seem that Butler’s state-
ment regarding Wittig concerns 
sex in the sense of the erotic 
rather than (as I have interpreted 
it) in the sense of biological sex 
difference. But the context makes 
clear that Butler sees these two 
senses of sex as integrally related. 
(Just before the above-quoted 
statement she writes: “For Wit-
tig, when we name sexual differ-
ence, we create it,” and “What 
distinguishes the sexes are those 
anatomical features, which either 
bear on reproduction directly, or 
are construed to aid in its even-
tual success.”) Butler understands 
the integral relation as follows: 
because our gender norms are 
organized by heteronormativity, 
it is those bodily properties that 
are relevant to heterosexual sex 
and reproduction that are taken to 
define us and to sort us into two 
sexes—so that the two senses of 
sex are, effectively, conflated.
3 The phrase “dilemma of explana-
tion” comes from Inwood 59–64.
4 University of Nottingham 
Seminar held by Irigaray, June 
2006. Reported in Roland de 
Vries, unpublished doctoral 
dissertation.
5 For a statement of this position, 
see Stryker, who writes: “The 
so-called ‘sex of the body’ is an 
interpretive fiction” (62).
6 I defend this view in chapter 1 of 
An Introduction.
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